Interstate High Speed Rail
American companies built the world’s best rail infrastructure for freight trains, passenger trains, and streetcars. Federal, state & county governments added seaport, highway, and airport infrastructure that helped America become the world’s largest economy. Powerful opponents prevented Streetcar conversions to Rapid Transit and Intercity Passenger Rail conversions to High-Speed Rail. As a result, every American pays a Traffic Congestion Tax, high smog levels persist, and we are the world’s 2nd largest contributor to Greenhouse Gas emissions. — Thomas Dorsey, Soul Of America
American cities once teemed with streetcars. A few also had Metro Rail lines, the fastest mode of Rapid Transit. Passenger trains were plentiful, amenity-rich, and reached 100 mph. They all met at train stations because America had nearly 100,000 miles of Intercity Passenger Rail.
Shortly after World War II ended in September 1945, Presidents, Congress, Governors, and State Legislatures accelerated taxpayer funding of Highway and Aviation infrastructure. Drivers paid fuel taxes for highways. Airfare included surcharges for airport upgrades. Public bonds and income taxes covered the balance of Highway and Aviation infrastructure costs.
The Aviation and Highway lobbies had a shared interest in attracting more federal, state, and county investment to airports and highways.
How US Passenger Rail Fell Behind
Though passed in 1944, the GI Bill spurred non-grid-pattern home development in the suburbs after World War II. Their curved and cul-de-sac roadways were perfect for automobiles, but anathema for streetcars that function best along straighter roadways. American politicians ignored opportunities to convert streetcar lines to faster Metro Rail within older cities.
In 1947, a federal court allowed a consortium of automotive and oil companies to purchase streetcar systems across America. They conspired to gradually reduce maintenance and service frequency which helped destroy streetcar ridership.
In 1952, Congress and President Truman passed a law that limited trains to 79 mph unless they had railroad over/underpasses in most of their route. In practice, the average speeds for passenger trains slowed to 55-60 mph.
In 1956, Congress and President Eisenhower allocated $25 billion (worth $290 billion in 2025) to establish the Interstate Highway System. In practice, people drive 70-85 mph for long stretches on them.
In 1958, the Commercial Jet Age began. People could still arrive only 15 minutes before take-off. Faster airplanes with smoother rides quickly took business travel longer than 200 miles from passenger trains.
As Interstate Highways opened over 1958-71, passenger rail ridership in the same 30-200 mile corridors tanked because their average speeds were slower than driving and more people enjoyed personal mobility.
By 1964, only a few streetcar lines in New Orleans, San Francisco, and Philadelphia survived.
If more detail interests you, spend 7 minutes reviewing American Passenger Rail History to understand how we built the world’s greatest passenger rail and streetcar networks, then let them atrophy.
As of 2025, America has very little High-Speed Rail (HSR) mileage and our government has inconsistent definitions for it. Frankly, it’s best to use standard definitions where HSR thrives. UIC, the international agency representing railways worldwide, has these speed definitions by kilometers per hour (kph) that I translate to mph:
Regional Rail: Electric and Diesel-electric-powered trains for intercity travel that reaches 150-190 kph (93-118 mph)
1st Generation HSR: Upgraded electric railway for intercity passenger trains to reach 200-230 kph (124-143 mph)
2nd Generation HSR: Better upgraded electric railway for intercity passenger trains to reach 250-270 kph (155-168 mph)
3rd Generation HSR: Dedicated electric railway for intercity passenger trains to reach 280-310 kph (174-193 mph)
4th Generation HSR: Straighter dedicated electric railway for intercity passenger trains to reach 320-400 kph (199-249 mph)
An Intercity Passenger Rail Leader Emerges
Shortly after World War II ended in September 1945, America invested $2.2 billion ($26 billion in 2024 dollars) to help rebuild Japan’s infrastructure in part, to make it an export market for American goods. Japan Railway Company (JRC) started rebuilding the electric rail corridor between its 3 largest metro areas (Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka).
Bombings during the war made it easier for JRC to acquire rights-of-way to ease curves and build railroad over/underpasses to separate automobiles and pedestrians from fast trains.
Hitachi developed lighter-weight electric-powered passenger trains that accelerate & brake faster. Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka expanded their Metro Rail and Commuter Rail lines to/from train stations.
Japanese citizens and automakers wanted more personal mobility by car too. They convinced the Japanese government to start building a National Tollway System in 1957. To prevent excessive dependence on foreign oil, however, the tollway system was limited to 4 lanes between cities and a strict 62 mph speed limit. It connected to urban freeways having only 4-6 lanes.
By 1958, Japan started airport modernization aligned with the Commercial Jet Age. Its government committed to investing $3.6 billion to upgrade signaling & electric systems and build dedicated passenger tracks, new bridges, tunnels & viaducts in the 320-mile Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka High-Speed Rail (HSR) corridor.
During the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics, Japan introduced 210 kph (130 mph) HSR between Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka. Journeys were completed in 3 hours and train frequencies were doubled. Called “Shinkansen”, it showcased Japan’s return to the world stage as a tech-savvy nation. Once the Shinkansen hit 100,000 daily passengers in 1965, no one cared that the construction cost was double the original estimate.
In response, France, Italy, West Germany, and the United Kingdom quickly funded projects to upgrade several intercity passenger lines to reach 200-201 kph (124-125 mph).
Japan’s HSR success also embarrassed Congress and President Johnson to fund an electric HSR project called Metroliner in the Washington-NYC corridor in 1965. If it attracted high ridership, the public would demand more HSR project funding.
The Highway and Aviation lobbies recognized the public funding and ridership threat from Metroliner HSR. With brutal efficiency, they spread HSR lies, half-truths, and opinions misrepresented as facts to misled news media, local politicians, and citizens. Their influence convinced Congress and Presidents Johnson & Nixon to fund Metroliner trains without upgrading the Washington-Baltimore-Philadelphia-Newark-NYC HSR infrastructure.
Metroliner trains were capable of 125 mph in commercial operation but were forced to utilize old signaling & electric systems, old tracks & switches, and 75- to 100-year-old bridges & tunnels. Since there were too many level railroad crossings, too many places where high-speed, commuter & freight trains shared 2 or 3 bumpy tracks, and insufficient fencing, Metroliner was quickly demoted to 100 mph for safety reasons.
Though Congress and President Nixon created Amtrak in 1971 to save U.S. Passenger Rail, the Vietnam War ramp-up (1965-1974) and HSR opponent influence derailed Presidents Ford and Carter from funding sufficient Washington-NYC infrastructure upgrades to achieve 125 mph HSR speed.
Carter did, however, obtain enough Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) grants to eliminate level railroad crossings with under/overpasses and install complete fencing between Washington and NYC by 1984. That enabled Metroliner to reach 110 mph in some mileage.
President Reagan and the first President Bush refused to fund Amtrak upgrades from 1981-1992.
Clinton Kickstarts Lackluster High-Speed Rail in America
In 1993, America’s Interstate Highways in the Boston-NYC-Washington Corridor permitted a 70 mph speed limit, but tollway booths limited drivers to about 60 mph average speed. Intercity travelers were also frustrated by frequent traffic jams.
To rebound faster from the 1990-91 economic recession, Congress approved stimulus funds for President Clinton to deploy in ready-to-build projects like the 457-mile Boston-NYC-Washington rail corridor that Amtrak calls “Northeast Corridor HSR.” With higher Household Incomes and higher Population Density than the Brussels-Paris-Marseille HSR corridor, the project looked promising for French TGV-like ridership:
457 Miles: Boston (5M) – New Haven (500K) – NYC (17M) – Philadelphia (6M) – Baltimore (2M) – DC (4M) = 34 Million Pop.
523 Miles: Brussels (1M) – Lille (1M) – Paris (9M) – Lyon (2M) – Valence (1M) – Avignon (500K) – Marseille (2M) = 15 Million Pop.
Highway & Aviation Lobbies Increase Attacks on High-Speed Rail
America’s Highway and Aviation lobbies feared Amtrak Northeast Corridor HSR reaching a TGV-like 186 mph, high frequency, safety, and ridership success. That would spark public demand for a robust Interstate HSR System.
To the Highway Lobby, an Interstate HSR System would reduce intercity drives, car rentals, bus rides, concrete & asphalt sales, and compete for USDOT & state funding. To the Aviation Lobby, an Interstate HSR System would reduce 200-450 mile regional flights, lower jet sales, and compete for USDOT & state funding.
That competitive threat motivated Highway and Aviation lobbies to fund Reason, Cato, and Heritage Foundation think tanks to mislead news media, politicians, and the public with more lies and distortions about HSR. Despite that media and political fog, Amtrak hoped to get at least $12 billion in federal funding. That would have been enough to attract at least $6 billion in state funding for the Northeast Corridor HSR project.
President Clinton’s FRA invested only $4.3 billion/8 years which only attracted about $1.5 billion from states funding for the project. That $5.8 billion total could only upgrade signaling, smooth tracks, and purchase high-speed trains that tilt on curves. No bridges or tunnels were replaced or upgraded, nor was the electrical system upgraded or curves eased. That limited 326 miles in the Northeast Corridor to 30-110 mph speeds.
A 17-mile segment between Boston and Providence and a discontinuous 17 miles between Providence and New Haven were planned for 165 mph but wide passenger cabins that tilted on curves were too close for passing freight trains on parallel tracks. For safety, the Federal Railroads Administration (FRA) limited Acela HSR top speed to 150 mph.
About 95 miles of New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland railway infrastructure were upgraded to support 120-135 mph. Though sub-par by international standards, nearly 230 miles of 120-150 mph speeds would still invoke a reason to brand Amtrak’s new high-speed train “Acela”, a portmanteau representing Acceleration and Excellence.
Amtrak Metroliner trains topped at 125 mph again and were rebranded to Amtrak Northeast Regional. With more regional stops and fares about 60% lower than Acela, Northeast Regional became popular with budget travelers.
Bush II Drops the Ball on High-Speed Rail
The second President Bush pounced on Amtrak’s infrastructure shortcomings for slow speeds and low ridership. He nearly killed FRA funding to every Amtrak service outside the Northeast Corridor.
Then the 9-11-2001 Terrorist Attack revealed a critical need for Northeast Corridor HSR. Highway bridges & tunnels to NYC closed, so Congress rode Acela to survey tragic wreckage at the NYC Trade Center.
Shortly afterward, hassles from airport security and longer queues formed in every aspect of air travel. To maintain profits, airlines shortened legroom in Coach Class. Nor did airplanes have WiFi or many electrical outlets at that time.
In contrast, Amtrak passengers experienced shorter NYC-Newark-Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington trip times. Acela and Northeast Regional had 26 combined daily roundtrips spread over 18 hours. Passengers appreciated their 87-89% schedule reliability, fast boarding-offboarding process, wide seats with ample legroom, WiFi, electric outlets, a cafe cabin, and restroom access at any time.
A Yale graduate like his father, President Bush II knew many college students rode trains between Yale’s location in New Haven up to Boston, and down to NYC, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington. His USDOT also reminded him that more people ride commuter trains than Amtrak in the New Haven-Stamford-NYC-Newark-Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington rail corridor.
With significant ridership by 2004, Amtrak requested Northeast Corridor HSR Phase 2 funding to replace old tunnels, bridges, and electrical systems, and to ease some curves. If funded Newark-Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington segment would have upgraded to 155-185 mph and the curvier Newark-NYC-Stamford-New Haven segment would have upgraded to 90-110 mph. Amtrak could anticipate 3X-4X ridership growth.
When Acela and Northeast Regional trains entered operating profit in 2006, Bush II had sufficient evidence to persuade Congress to authorize $12 billion/5 years of Phase 2 USDOT funding and attract $6 billion more from Northeast Corridor states. Phase 3 funding to upgrade the New Haven-Providence-Boston segment could have been left to a future President and Congress. Unfortunately, Bush II did nothing for Amtrak from 2001-2008.
Obama’s Underperforming Intercity Passenger Rail Initiative
During his 2008 Presidential Campaign, Obama promised large funding for Amtrak and two state-sponsored HSR projects. Sensing an opportunity for job creation with a progressive President and Congress over 2009-10, 37 governors sent President Obama 259 state applications requesting $57 billion of USDOT grants for Intercity Passenger Rail projects.
As showcase projects, Northeast Corridor HSR needed $20 billion, California HSR needed $20 billion, Florida HSR needed $10 billion, and Chicago-Midwest HSR needed $8 billion in USDOT grants.
In February 2009, Congress and President Obama only passed a $787 billion economic stimulus package. Obama could have gone significantly higher but thought he could get more bipartisan infrastructure funding in the last 2 years of his first term. So he allocated only $8.5 billion to the FRA for HSR projects and $5 billion for the Amtrak train maintenance backlog.
For political reasons, new Florida and Wisconsin governors rejected their smaller-than-needed HSR project grants. Amtrak also created a PR disaster by planning a new Amtrak Cleveland-Columbus-Cincinatti corridor with an average speed slower than driving. Understandably, the new Ohio governor rejected that grant but would have accepted it to upgrade speed in the existing Amtrak Toledo-Cleveland corridor.
Their meager FRA grants were redirected to other states. California HSR only received $3.5 billion. Two Chicago-Midwest HSR projects received only $2 billion. Northeast Corridor HSR only received $1 billion, and Amtrak split the $2 billion remainder on new Amtrak Regional trains that only reached 79 mph.
More importantly, Obama’s Intercity Passenger Rail policy failed because he did not approve at least $950 billion in economic stimulus, rather than $787 billion, to keep his campaign promise of many HSR, Rapid Transit, and Sustainable Energy projects. If he did, Obama could have allocated $63 billion in FRA grants featuring four HSR projects that would have 160-220 mph top speeds:
$20 billion Northeast Corridor HSR
$20 billion California HSR
$10 billion Florida (Tampa-Orlando-Fort Lauderdale-Miami) HSR
$ 8 billion Milwaukee-Chicago-Gary/Hammond-Kalamazoo-Ann Arbor-Detroit HSR
By underestimating political opposition to his agenda after the 2009 economic stimulus, Obama chose not to fund at those levels.
Unemployment in 2010 was still high during the Great Recession. Infrastructure projects could have employed at least half a million people. Dissatisfaction with a high Unemployment Rate was a key reason Democrats lost their House of Representatives majority in the November 2010 election.
President Obama still requested $53 billion/6 years for Amtrak Regional & HSR projects in his early 2011 Transportation Proposal to the House of Representatives. Obama believed the 2011 GOP-majority House of Representatives would fatten the Transportation proposal with more Highway and Aviation funding, and then send it to the Democratic-majority Senate to pass for his signature. Both parties could claim they lowered unemployment.
Unfortunately, the GOP-majority House vowed to make Obama a one-term President by allowing the Unemployment Rate to remain higher than necessary. In each Congressional funding cycle from 2011 to 2016, Obama was denied a higher Transportation and Electric Grid budget.
From 2017-20, Trump did not fund major infrastructure projects.
Auto-Jet Culture, Inadequate for the 21st Century
During the Vietnam War, our political leaders focused on Highway and Aviation investment. We can give them a pass for HSR, Regional Rail & Metro Heavy Rail underinvestment from 1965 to mid-1974.
The 1973 Oil Embargo, however, should have motivated them to get serious about electric, high-speed, high-capacity Transportation and Electric Grid investment in mid-1974. They could have avoided 540% of infrastructure project inflation from mid-1974 to 2022.
By 2019, Statista ranked America’s Infrastructure a lousy 13th. Also that year, a Railroad Infrastructure Quality report by The Global Economy shows the USA ranked 11th. Our Intercity Passenger Rail failures correlate to a lengthy span of low federal & state railroad funding.
Yearly Intercity Railroad spending by the Federal Railroads Administration; credit Urban Institute/Yonah Freemark
Yonah Freemark of the Urban Institute tracked our Federal Railroad investment since 1977. The same scale of underinvestment is true for Rapid Transit and Electric Grid projects.
Our Global Economic Competitors expanded Highway, Rapid Transit, Intercity Passenger Rail, Aviation & Electric Grid infrastructure decades earlier. Though they reap benefits today, larger benefits are coming over 2025-50.
This 7-part series focuses on why America needs better HSR, Regional Rail & Rapid Transit while modernizing Highways, Aviation, and Sustainable Energy to prevent falling further behind. Part 2 outlines the benefits we can also enjoy from a robust Interstate HSR & Regional Rail System.