Interstate High Speed Rail System Needed
American companies built the world’s best rail infrastructure for freight trains, passenger trains, and streetcars. Federal, state & county governments added seaport, highway, and airport infrastructure that helped America become the world’s largest economy. Powerful opponents prevented Streetcar conversions to Rapid Transit and Intercity Passenger Rail conversions to High-Speed Rail. As a result, every American pays a Traffic Congestion Tax, high smog levels persist, and we are the world’s 2nd largest contributor to Greenhouse Gas emissions. — Thomas Dorsey, Soul Of America
American cities once teemed with Streetcars. A few also had Metro Rail lines, the fastest mode of Rapid Transit. Passenger trains were plentiful, amenity-rich, and reached 100 mph. They all met at train stations because America had nearly 100,000 miles of Intercity Passenger Rail.
When World War II ended in September 1945, Presidents, Congress, Governors, and State Legislatures accelerated taxpayer funding of Highway and Aviation infrastructure. Drivers paid fuel taxes for highways. Airfare included surcharges for airport upgrades. Public bonds and income taxes covered the balance of Highway and Aviation Infrastructure costs.
Though airlines collected ticket surcharges to help build & maintain Aviation infrastructure, their contribution was relatively small. Hence, the Aviation and Highway lobbies had a shared interest in attracting more federal, state, and county investment to airports.
Intercity passenger trains were destined to lose long-distance ridership to faster jets, but their medium-distance (25-350 miles) ridership also plummeted because trains could no longer average speeds faster than cars on highways. In the 1950s, Governors and county commissioners bragged about additional jobs that new highways and bigger airports attracted. They never mentioned lost passenger train jobs.
The post-war GI Bill spurred the development of single-family homes in non-grid patterns for suburban communities. Their land design patterns were perfect for automobiles, but anathema for streetcars that work best in grid patterns and straighter lines. Since pubic officials were convinced that streetcars were “Obsolete Technology”, they ignored opportunities to convert streetcar lines to Metro Rail. After 1964, only a couple of streetcar lines in New Orleans, San Francisco, and Philadelphia survived.
Since World War II, federal, state, and county governments have invested over $2 trillion in Highway infrastructure and $800 billion in Aviation infrastructure. Prior to 2022, they invested less than $50 billion in Intercity Passenger Rail infrastructure. Though many billions of dollars went to Transit agencies for slow bus service, very little went to Metro Rail projects.
High-Speed Rail Threat To Powerful Select Industries
In 1965, Congress and President Johnson reacted by funding an electric High-Speed Rail (HSR) project in the Washington-Baltimore-Philadelphia-Newark-NYC corridor that became the Metroliner. If it succeeded, HSR could spread nationwide and threaten Highway and Aviation domination of publicly funded Transportation Infrastructure. It would also reduce gasoline and jet fuel sales.
With brutal efficiency, Highway and Aviation lobbies spread HSR lies, half-truths, and opinions misrepresented as facts. Their public influence convinced Congress and Presidents to only fund a new high-speed train, not to upgrade the railway infrastructure between Washington and NYC. They also misled news media, politicians, and naive citizens to believe lies, half-truths, and opinions misrepresented as facts. America’s Presidents, Congress, Governors, and State Legislatures also fumbled Streetcar upgrades to Rapid Transit.
If the backstory interests you, spend 7 minutes reviewing American Passenger Rail History to understand how we built the world’s greatest passenger rail and streetcar networks, then let them atrophy.
Understanding Intercity Passenger Rail first requires the definition of speeds. Since America has so little HSR mileage and our government has inconsistent definitions of HSR, it’s best to use broadly accepted definitions where HSR thrives. UIC, the international agency representing Intercity Passenger Rail systems, has precise Regional Rail, 1st, 2nd & 3rd Generation HSR speed definitions listed below by kilometers per hour (kph) and miles per hour (mph). In America, Suburban Rail is called Commuter Rail:
Suburban Rail: Mostly diesel-powered trains that reach 130-150 kph (81-93 mph)
Regional Rail: Electric and Diesel-powered trains for intercity travel that reaches 160-200 kph (99-124 mph)
1st Generation HSR: Upgraded electric railway for intercity passenger trains to reach 200-230 kph (124-143 mph)
2nd Generation HSR: Better upgraded electric railway for intercity passenger trains to reach 250-270 kph (155-168 mph)
3rd Generation HSR: Dedicated electric railway for intercity passenger trains to reach 280-310 kph (174-193 mph)
4th Generation HSR: Straighter dedicated electric railway for intercity passenger trains to reach 320-400 kph (199-249 mph)
Should Japan be Our Nation-Model for High-Speed Rail?
In 1993, American politics briefly aligned to begin upgrading the Washington-NYC-Boston corridor to HSR status. Should we have modeled that HSR project after Japan? Let’s have a look.
Shortly after World War II, America invested $2.2 billion ($22 billion in 2020 dollars) to help rebuild Japan’s infrastructure in part, to make it an export market for American goods. Japan Railway Company (JRC) started rebuilding the rail corridor between its largest metro areas (Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka) as an electric railway route with over/underpasses at roadway crossings. Bombings during the war enabled JRC to more easily acquire rights-of-way for straiter curves. Hitachi converted bulky diesel-powered passenger trains to lighter-weight electric-powered passenger trains that accelerate & brake faster. Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka expanded their Metro Rail and Commuter Rail lines from train stations.
Japanese citizens and automakers wanted more personal mobility by car too. They convinced the Japanese government to start building a National Tollway System in 1957. To prevent excessive dependence on foreign oil, however, the tollway system was limited to 4 lanes between cities, a strict 62 mph speed limit, and high tolls. It connected to narrow 4-6 lane urban freeways.
By 1958, Japan’s economy was back on its feet and the Commercial Jet Age began worldwide. The Japanese government started airport modernization. The same year, Japan invested the equivalent of $3.6 billion to further upgrade the 320-mile Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka passenger rail corridor.
In 1964, Japan introduced the world’s first electric-powered HSR between Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka. Top speed was 130 mph and journeys were completed in 3 hours. Called “Shinkansen”, it debuted during the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics and showcased Japan’s return to the world stage as a tech-savvy nation. Shinkansen proved that HSR fed by Regional Rail, Commuter Rail, and Metro Rail patrons at train stations attracts high ridership. Japan’s tech success embarrassed President Johnson and Congress to partially fund the aforementioned Washington-NYC HSR project.
By 1993, the Shinkansen carried over 2 billion passengers and attracted so many riders that airlines cut flights between Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and other parts of Japan. No one cared that the final Shinkansen construction cost was double the original estimate.
Despite its tremendous passenger rail achievements, Japan was not the best HSR model for America. Japan has 2.5 times the population density of the Northeast, America’s densest region, coupled with high incomes. The combination of hyper-dense population, high imported oil costs, slow tollways, full embrace of HSR, Commuter Rail upgraded to Regional Rail, the world’s most comprehensive Metro Rail network, and lower car ownership was too dissimilar for America to adopt Shinkansen HSR Best Practices.
Which European Country Should Feature The HSR Model for America?
Railways, roadways, airports, and factories in Europe were heavily bombed in World War II. In 1948, America invested $15 billion ($162 billion in 2021 dollars) to help rebuild European infrastructure and revive the continent as an export market for American goods.
Once Japan proved it could commercially operate at 210 kph (130 mph), many European nations accelerated R&D for passenger trains to achieve higher speeds too. By 1965, the railway agencies of Italy, France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom sought to boost their 150-170 kph (93-106 mph) Regional Rail speeds.
Western Europe also competed in airplane manufacturing but did not have a single company large enough to compete with Boeing. Over 1970-71, a consortium of airplane companies from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, and the Netherlands formed Airbus to compete with Boeing. Airbus successfully lobbied for public-funded airport expansion across Europe.
In the 1970s, Italy had a modest population density, half of America’s Median Household Income, and half of America’s percentage of car ownership. Italy imported most of its oil. Its airports were not congested. Many drivers exceeded the 130 kph (81 mph) Autostrade Tollway speed limit. Italian sports cars were celebrated and exported worldwide. Italian trains were not, though most Italians rode them.
Rome and Florence had Regional Rail and Suburban Rail lines anchoring their train stations. By the late 1970s, an Italian company introduced the Pendolino, whose tilt-train technology lets trains go faster in curves without upsetting passengers. Those conditions were sufficient for Italy to open a modest HSR line between Rome and Florence in 1979.
Unfortunately, that first HSR route in Europe was plagued with mismanagement and mediocre rail infrastructure that crippled speed in many places and lowered schedule reliability. Those conditions depressed ridership and slowed expansion for a decade. Italy was not a good HSR model for America in 1993, but Pendolino tilt technology found its way into many High-Speed Trains (HST).
By treaty after World War II, Russia controlled East Germany, excluding West Berlin. East Germany was forced to become a Communist nation. Since Russia had to rebuild its economy, helping East Germany rebuild infrastructure and recover its economy was not a priority.
By the same treaty, America, France, and the United Kingdom controlled West Germany and forced it to become a Democratic nation. America invested in West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Belgium to help rebuild their infrastructure and upsize their markets to purchase many of our exports.
West Germany’s economy was strong enough to start HSR R&D by 1965 and potential HSR construction by 1973. However, it had to overcome more than a decade of lawsuits related to HSR route alignments. That country also had to reunite with East Germany in 1990.
Given those limiting conditions, a unified Germany did not open its first 155 mph HSR line until 1991. Thus, German HSR technology was not well-proven by 1993. Nor did the United Kingdom, Spain, or Belgium satisfy enough technical, demographic, and economic conditions to be an HSR model for America.
France, HSR Nation-Model for America
France had a population size similar to America’s Northeast Region. Unlike the rest of Europe, Paris train stations, Metro Rail, and Streetcars were spared from bombing.
Following Japan’s lead, France boosted HSR R&D in 1965. By 1970, the French economy was in good shape and population density was increasing in the Lille-Paris-Lyon-Valence-Avignon-Marseille-Cannes-Nice corridor. That corridor had about 70% of America’s Median Household Income and a relatively high car-ownership percentage that often clogged its 110-130 kph (68-81 mph) Autoroute Tollway System.
To remain competitive with Autoroute Tollway and Commercial Aviation, the French train maker Alstom accelerated R&D for its High-Speed Train (HST) based on jet-turbine engines that consumed oil. Things looked promising when the test Alstom HST sustainably operated at 270 kph (168 mph) on the test track.
Before Alstom HST could be introduced for commercial operation a big October 1973 event led France to transform its Energy and Transportation policy. The OPEC Oil Embargo over 1973 staggered the French economy and exposed overdependence on foreign oil. When oil prices hiked, people cut tollway driving, and airlines jacked up fares. It crippled their economy.
To reduce oil dependence, the French government accelerated the construction of nuclear and hydroelectric power plants. SNCF accelerated the conversion of passenger railways from diesel power to electric power. Alstom re-engineered its HST for electric power.
Paris and Lyon would only be 243 miles apart by railway. Modest distance, large population size, and no large mountain range between them made the city-pair ideal for HSR. Between them, SNCF introduced state-of-the-art HSR infrastructure called “Ligne a Grande Vitesse”, which translates to “High-Speed Line.” The French call it “LGV.”
For straighter and flatter routes, LGV has under/overpasses at every roadway crossing, many tunnels, viaducts & embankments. It has premium track bedding, high-speed track switches, and shaved tracks for smooth rides. LGV’s electric power system has a higher voltage (25 kilovolts) to enable speeds up to 400 kph (249 mph). Every LGV has complete fencing and electronic track monitors for enhanced safety.
For efficient management and operations, SNCF spawned a new agency to operate the Alstom HST branded as “Train a Grande Vitesse.” That translates to “High-Speed Train.” The French called it, “TGV.”
After the 1973 OPEC Embargo, France funded SNCF to accelerate the conversion of Streetcar lines into Trams, an introductory mode of Rapid Transit. Alstom built Trams to have 3-4 times the capacity of Streetcars. For faster speeds than Streetcars and cars during Urban Rush Hour, Trams were given dedicated lanes taken from roadways, stops spaced further apart, and traffic signal priority to average 30-35 kph (19-22 mph). Paris expanded Regional Rail, Suburban Rail, and Metro Rail lines to train stations. Lyon began upgrading its Suburban Rail system and constructing a Metro Rail system connected to its train station.
In 1981, TGV launched on LGV between Paris and Lyon at 270 kph (168 mph) as the world’s fastest train in commercial operation. For an advanced European nation that never built a substantial automotive export market like the United Kingdom, West Germany, Sweden, and Italy, the world’s fastest train evoked French national pride.
By 1988, SNCF and Alstom technical tweaks enabled TGV to reach 186 mph on LGV. TGV frequency increased, Coach fares lowered, ridership boosted, and operating profits jumped. France also began speed and frequency upgrades to Suburban Rail and Regional Rail while accelerating Metro Rail construction in Paris, Lyon, Marseilles, Toulouse, and Lille. Belgium joined in by funding LGV from Brussels to Lille, enabling faster Brussels-Paris train journeys. The UK and France jointly funded a railway & roadway tunnel under the English Channel.
More Regional Rail, Suburban Rail, Metro Rail, and Tram access to TGV juiced its ridership, profits, and job creation. High foot traffic triggered a retail boom within and near train stations. That infrastructure success and national pride inspired France to vote for even faster expansion of LGV, Regional Rail, Suburban Rail, Metro Rail, and Trams nationwide by 1993.
Clinton Kickstarts Lackluster High-Speed Rail in America
In 1993, America’s northeastern Interstate Highways in the NYC-Washington Corridor permitted a 70 mph speed limit, but traffic congestion and tollway stops limited drivers to about 60 mph average speed. Amtrak Metroliner topped 110 mph but averaged below 65 mph with 4 stops between NYC and Washington.
America needed to rebound from an economic recession. So Congress approved economic stimulus funds for President Clinton to deploy in ready-to-build projects like the Northeast Corridor. The corridor had high ridership potential because it had higher Household Incomes and higher population density than the Brussels-Paris-Marseille LGV corridor:
457 Miles: Boston (5M) – New Haven (500K) – NYC (17M) – Philly (6M) – Baltimore (2M) – DC (4M) = 34 Million Pop.
523 Miles: Brussels (1M) – Lille (1M) – Paris (9M) – Lyon (2M) – Valence (1M) – Marseille (2M) = 15 Million Pop.
With those demographics, President Clinton’s U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) reasoned that the Northeast Corridor could produce TGV-like ridership success.
Highway & Aviation Lobbies Increase Attacks on High-Speed Rail
America’s Highway and Aviation lobbies feared Amtrak Northeast Corridor reaching 186 mph, high train frequency, and ridership success. That would spark demand for Interstate HSR expansion.
More specifically, the Highway Lobby feared it would reduce oil consumption from intercity car drives, intercity bus rides, car rentals, concrete & asphalt sales, and compete for USDOT & state funding. The Aviation Lobby also feared fewer regional flights, lower regional jet sales, and competition for USDOT & state funding.
The Interstate HSR threat motivated Highway and Aviation lobbies to fund Reason, Cato, and Heritage Foundation think tanks to mislead news media with lies and confusion about HSR. In turn, news media misled naive politicians and citizens. A majority of the 1993 Congress and governors believed HSR lies or hid behind the confusion.
In that political fog, USDOT and Amtrak expanded the Northeast Corridor HSR project to 457 miles (Washington-NYC-Boston) hoping to get more Congressional and state support for the project. Despite Amtrak asking for larger HSR project funding, President Clinton invested only $4.3 billion/8 years in federal funds through his USDOT. Congress and governors did not pressure Clinton to increase that amount, which attracted about $1.5 billion from state and county sources for $5.8 billion in total.
Total funding was only sufficient for a sub-par HSR upgrade and purchase of heavy High-Speed Trains (HST) from the Alstom-Bombardier consortium.
The fastest 17-mile segment between Boston suburbs and Providence was originally planned for 165 mph. But parallel tracks remained too close for passing freight trains. For safety, the Federal Railroads Administration (FRA) limited speed to 150 mph. About 95 miles of New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland infrastructure were upgraded to 125-135 mph. The other 345 miles of the 457-mile Northeast Corridor remained well below 110 mph.
The top speed, however, would still be a reason to brand Amtrak’s second High-Speed Train “Acela”, a portmanteau representing “Acceleration” and “Excellence.”
Amtrak Metroliner reached 125 mph on the better infrastructure segments and was rebranded Amtrak Northeast Regional to differentiate it as a Regional service with more stops than Acela. With fares about 60% lower than Acela, Northeast Regional became essential mobility for Northeast Corridor college students and others on a tight budget.
Despite mediocre infrastructure, Amtrak ridership jumped when Acela launched in 2000, joining Amtrak Northeast Regional service in the Northeast Corridor. In 2006, Amtrak Acela & Amtrak Northeast Regional entered operating profit.
Bush II Drops the Ball on High-Speed Rail
The second President Bush pounced on Amtrak’s shortcomings and slow speeds for other rail corridors. He nearly killed FRA funding to every Amtrak service outside the Northeast Corridor.
Then 9-11-2001 Terrorist Event revealed a critical need for Northeast Corridor HSR. Highway bridges & tunnels to NYC closed, so Congress rode Acela to survey tragic wreckage at the NYC Trade Center wreckage.
For everyone else, airport security hassle multiplied. Longer queues formed in every aspect of air travel. To maintain profits, airlines shortened legroom in Coach Class. Nor did airplanes have WiFi or many electrical outlets at that time.
In contrast, Amtrak passengers experienced shorter NYC-Newark-Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington travel time between Central Business Districts. Acela and Northeast Regional had 26 combined daily roundtrips spread over 18 hours. Train passengers appreciated their 87-89% schedule reliability, fast onboarding-offboarding, wide seats with ample legroom, WiFi, electric outlets, cafe cabin, and any-time restroom access.
A Yale grad like his father, Bush II knew college students often rode trains between New Haven, NYC, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington. The corridor also transports more Regional Rail commuters than Amtrak passengers. When Acela and Northeast Regional entered operating profit in 2006, President Bush II could have obtained enough Congressional votes to complete funding the Newark-Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington segment upgrade to 140-165 mph while upgrading the curvier Newark-NYC-Stamford-New Haven segment to 90-110 mph.
An Oil Man from Texas like his father, President Bush II would not push Republicans in the House to increase Northeast Corridor HSR funding.
Obama’s Underperforming Intercity Passenger Rail Initiative
During his 2008 Presidential Campaign, Obama promised large Amtrak funding. Sensing an opportunity for job-creation success with a progressive President and Congress in 2009, 37 governors adopted Intercity Passenger Rail project plans. President Obama received 259 state applications requesting $57 billion of USDOT grants for Amtrak Regional Rail & HSR projects. Northeast Corridor HSR and California HSR alone needed $40 billion in USDOT grants.
In February 2009, Congress and President Obama passed the $787 billion economic stimulus package. Since “Amtrak Joe” was his Vice President, Passenger Rail advocates hoped that Obama would designate $55 billion/5 years towards HSR projects along with $10 billion/5 years to address the maintenance backlog of other Amtrak trains.
Obama Miscalculates Political Timing for Infrastructure
President Obama thought he could prioritize Health Care his first 2 years, and then address Infrastructure funding the last 2 years of his first term. In 2009, he allocated only $8.5 billion to the FRA for HSR projects and $5 billion for the Amtrak maintenance backlog.
For political reasons, new Florida and Wisconsin governors rejected their economic stimulus grants for HSR & Regional Rail projects. Their funds were redirected to other states. Later, the Wisconsin governor backtracked by stating that he would have accepted a grant to upgrade the existing Amtrak infrastructure between Milwaukee and Chicago.
The FRA & Amtrak flubbed opportunity in Ohio by planning a new Amtrak service in the Cleveland-Columbus-Cincinatti corridor whose average speed would be slower than driving. Perceiving that it would attract low ridership and cost the state more to operate, the Ohio governor rejected the grant. Instead, the governor said he would have accepted a grant to upgrade the existing Amtrak Toledo-Cleveland-Youngstown service from 80 mph to 110 mph top speed and more frequency. Consequently, Ohio’s grant was also redirected to other states.
Ultimately, California HSR only received $3.5 billion, Northeast Corridor HSR only received $1 billion, and Amtrak split the $4 billion remainder on sub-par upgrades to 15 Amtrak Regional lines.
Obama’s Intercity Passenger Rail policy failed for three reasons. First, he did not approve at least a $900 billion economic stimulus (rather than $787 billion) to keep his campaign promise of launching HSR projects, improving Amtrak Regional service, and funding more Green Energy projects.
Second, he should have allocated $60 billion in FRA grants to four HSR projects:
$20 billion Northeast Corridor HSR
$20 billion California HSR
$10 billion Florida HSR
$10 billion Milwaukee-Chicago-Gary-Kalamazoo-Ann Arbor-Detroit HSR
Amtrak owned most of the 131-mile Kalamazoo-Ann Arbor-Detroit rail rights-of-way. That segment could wait for later funding to upgrade. Since state transportation agencies owned most Milwaukee-Chicago-Gary-Kalamazoo rail right-of-way, they would likely contribute 1/3rd of project funding when USDOT contributed 2/3rds. The HSR project would combine 2 Amtrak Regional lines affecting 4 states, enable passenger trains to travel through Chicago Union Station rather than terminate at it, and untangle freight rail delays in the Chicago region. When the Florida governor turned down his state’s HSR grant from USDOT, $5 billion should have gone to the Kalamazoo-Ann Arbor-Detroit HSR upgrade. The other $5 billion should have gone to America’s showcase HSR project in California, given that state just passed a nearly $10 billion HSR bond and was on the hook to commit a lot more.
Third, the 2009-10 Democratic-led Congress failed to boost the USDOT budget to grant $15 billion/year to HSR and Amtrak Regional upgrades. That $30 billion/2 years would have attracted about $15 billion/2 years from states, counties & freight rail companies wanting better passenger & freight rail service sharing the same routes. Even if a 2011-12 Republican-led Congress slashed the federal railroad budget, $45 billion could have upgraded 8 Amtrak Regional lines for higher speeds, frequency, reliability, and safety that Europeans call “Regional Rail.”
Unemployment from May to October 2010 of the Great Recession was 9.6%. Nearly 15 million Americans needed jobs and Transportation Infrastructure projects could employ many of them. Those circumstances led Obama to request $53 billion/6 years for Amtrak Regional & HSR projects within his larger 2011 Transportation Proposal for consideration by the House of Representatives.
President Obama believed the 2011 House of Representatives would send a Transportation Proposal to the Senate that contained more funds for Highway, Aviation, Railroads, Transit, and Electric Energy projects as best suited to each state. If he succeeded, millions of Infrastructure jobs would have been created.
Though Automotive opposition to better Intercity Passenger Rail subsided, Obama underestimated Fossil Fuel’s influence over the U.S. House of Representatives and Statehouses that would drastically change after the November 2010 Election.
Most mid-term voters were conservative-rural-suburban who cared more about Highways and Airports. A lower percentage of mid-term voters were progressive-urban-suburban who care about Passenger Rail, Rapid Transit, and Green Energy.
In January 2011, a new conservative majority led the U.S. House of Representatives. They vowed to make Obama a one-term President. Backed by Highway and Aviation lobbies, the House majority would not permit higher funding for Intercity Passenger Rail, Rapid Transit, Wind, Solar or Electric Grid upgrades.
Each Congressional funding cycle from 2011 to 2016, the Obama Administration requested a higher budget for federal Highway bridge repair, Aviation, Transit, and Railroad grants. Each time the House of Representatives rejected President Obama’s proposals by sending “Same-Level-of-Funding” budget proposals to the Senate for a vote. Amtrak only received a pittance of maintenance funds. No new Northeast Corridor HSR, California HSR, Amtrak Regional, or Electric Energy funding was approved by the House of Representatives.
If the Senate and President Obama did not sign the 2011-16 House of Representatives budget proposals, high unemployment would persist. With no better alternatives, they signed. Fortunately, the economic stimulus and reduced Defense spending helped unemployment drop by half during the Obama Administration.
The next president delivered no Transportation Infrastructure of significance.
Auto-Jet Culture, Inadequate for the 21st Century
By only prioritizing Highway and Aviation investment since the Vietnam War began in 1964, we’re wearing that infrastructure out faster than we repair it, particularly Highway bridges.
In 2019, Statista ranked America’s Infrastructure a lousy 13th. Also that year, a Railroad Infrastructure Quality report by The Global Economy shows the USA ranked 11th. Our Intercity Passenger Rail failures correlate to lengthy spans of objectively low Federal Railroad funding.
Yearly Intercity Railroad spending by the Federal Railroads Administration; credit Urban Institute/Yonah Freemark
Yonah Freemark of the Urban Institute tracked our Federal Railroad investment since 1977. If Yonah Freemark’s chart went back to 1964, it would illustrate that America shortchanged Federal Railroad investment since 1964. The same scale of underinvestment is true for Rapid Transit, Electric Grid, Wind & Solar projects.
Give American political leaders a pass for underinvestment during the Vietnam War (1964 to mid-1974). The 1973 Oil Embargo should have motivated them to get serious about HSR, Regional Rail, Commuter Rail, Metro Heavy Rail, Metro Light Rail (Trams), and Electric Grid investment in 2H 1974. Instead, Democrats and Republicans squandered one opportunity after another.
Starting in 1974 through 1994, our Global Economic Competitors expanded Highway, Rapid Transit, Intercity Passenger Rail & Aviation infrastructure and accelerated Electric Grid modernization to support them. Though they reap benefits from Auto-Transit-Train-Jet Culture today, larger benefits are coming over 2025-45.
Falling further behind the infrastructure of Global Economic Competitors has terrible economic and environmental consequences. This 7-part series focuses on why America needs better HSR, Regional Rail, and Metro Rail while modernizing Highways, Aviation, and the Electric Grid.
If you would like to know details about HSR and Regional Rail technologies, I recommend a 4-minute read of the Interstate High-Speed Rail Taxonomy linked below before reading Part 2.
