California High Speed Rail Funding Politics
By Summer 2008, Japan, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Belgium, and South Korea had several thousand miles of High-Speed Rail (HSR). China opened its first HSR line during the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics. Our Global Economic Competitors made Intercity HSR a national priority like their Space programs.
In America, California HSR isn’t just a mega-project. It’s another Apollo-like opportunity, but we haven’t funded it that way.

Two National Priorities, Two Funding Models; source Thomas Dorsey for Public Domain
In the preceding California High-Speed Rail article, I laid out mistakes by California Governor Schwarzenegger, California State Legislature, California HSR Authority, and California Department of Transportation (CalTrans) from 1996 through December 2008.
Despite their mistakes, voters passed the $9.95 billion California HSR Bond Measure in November 2008. Their mistakes left a door open for Highway Lobby and Aviation Lobby opponents to establish a negative narrative for California HSR project.
Let’s pick it up from mid-December 2008 when President-Elect Obama recruited Republican Congressman Ray LaHood to be his Secretary of Transportation while the American Recovery & Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was being crafted.
On 21 January 2009, Congress easily confirmed LaHood to be Secretary of U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT), in part, because he served on a Congressional Transportation Committee and shared Obama’s desire for better Highways, Airports, Rapid Transit, Intercity Passenger Rail and Freight Rail.
We had a lot to learn about HSR’s political, technical and funding requirements that are different from Amtrak Regional and Long-Distance lines. Around the world, successful HSR systems are a national priority with large sustained federal funding for “True” HSR whose international definition is now 155+ mph (250+ kmph).
Even the lower Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) HSR definition of 150+ mph speeds require straighter routes that typically include long tunnels, viaducts & embankments too expensive for private company Return On Investment (ROI) models. Their ROI models work best on High-Speed Train operation & maintenance and Transportation-Oriented Development in & around stations.
That is why successful HSR systems require large sustained public funding to create rail infrastructure that enables attractive revenue to private passenger train operators the same way public airport infrastructure enables attractive revenue to passenger airlines. That only happens when high-level politicians make it a priority to overcome start-up mistakes, technical obstacles, and industry opponents who fear competition from great passenger trains.
Absent national priority, America’s HSR projects remained subject to small piecemeal funding, excessive regulation, and horrific opposition by Highway & Aviation lobbies. Our result was that most politicians refused to make HSR a national & state priority for three True HSR projects:
• 160 mph, 457-mile Northeast Corridor HSR, Modernization
• 185 mph, 324-mile Florida HSR, New Start
• 220 mph, 496-mile California HSR, New Start
If Northeast Corridor HSR Modernization and California HSR and Florida HSR Initial Operating Segments were fully funded to upgrade or complete sooner, they would inspire Interstate HSR projects nationwide the same way our Interstate Highway System and Hub Airports blossomed. That was not to be.

Fear of a Senate Filibuster, the inability for 60 Senators to approve a bill, prevented ARRA from being large enough to grant roughly $20 billion to Northeast Corridor HSR Modernization, $15 billion to California HSR, $10 billion to Florida HSR, and fund several Amtrak Regional Rail Modernizations.
Despite having a profitable Northeast Corridor HSR (Boston-Providence-New Haven-NYC-Newark-Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington) route since 2006, Amtrak as a whole only received a $1.3 billion ARRA grant.
I’ll address the disappointing hyper-partisan Florida HSR situation later.
Though $15 billion was preferable, California HSR Authority needed at least $9.95 billion to properly staff up, meet its HSR bond’s legal requirement for a 50% federal match. That match would have greatly reduced state politician fear that we could not fund the Initial Operating Segment and prevent lawsuit delay based on insufficient funds.
Since California HSR Authority was a skeleton crew until 2012, we should not be surprised that it published a flimsy December 2008 Draft Business Plan and could not execute confidence-building meetings with Secretary LaHood, USDOT’s Federal Railroad Administration, and bipartisan Congressional Transportation Committees.
In Washington funding politics, optics also matter. While President Obama was signing the $787 billion ARRA in February 2009, California Senator Boxer was focused on adding $51 billion Highway funding atop ARRA funding.
Boxer’s Highway funding proposal failed. As a sitting member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation and Chair of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, however, she added to bad California HSR optics by not prioritizing a $9.95 billion ARRA HSR grant.
For competitive grants such as High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail (HSIPR) and Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER), first consider how USDOT Federal/State-County Grant Match Formulas apply to other modes of transportation:

USDOT Competitive Grant Match Formulas by popular modes of transportation; source USDOT data
UCLA’s Transportation Institute finds that since the Highway Trust Fund began in 1956, the U.S. has spent about $2.5 trillion in inflation-adjusted dollars on Highways, and 60% of it came after the original Interstate System Plan was largely finished in 1992.
Since the Commercial Jet Age began in 1958, our political leaders have invested around $700 billion in airport Aviation Infrastructure (airports, air traffic control, security). At minimum, our scale of Interstate HSR & Regional Rail investment needs to quickly catch up with Aviation Infrastructure.
Global Economic Competitors opening 168+ mph HSR Systems since 1981 alerted us to accelerate HSR construction or trail further behind in this essential Transportation Mode. As another “Moonshot” of sorts, 75% federal funding should have been the starting point for three True HSR projects that could attract high ridership.
In our hyper-partisan political environment since January 2009, that was not going to happen.
That said, Congress and President Obama should have been negotiating no less than 60% federal formula grants to Northeast Corridor, California and Florida HSR projects, like New Rapid Transit Projects.
Given our rural-dominant U.S. Senate doesn’t value Transportation Infrastructure that mostly benefit urban areas, however, the best we could hope for was 50% federal / 50% state-county on New Start HSR & Regional Rail projects. to those Senators, it doesn’t matter that the large urban areas generate most taxes to subsidize their public benefits.
Based on $9.95 billion California HSR Bond passage, no other state put up that level of funding in any Transportation project. A 50% federal / 50% state-county funding formula, though not ideal, would still have difference-making impact.
In contrast to HSIPR, however, ARRA was a competitive 100% federal grant program with NO state-county match required. Nevertheless, context for meaningful impact should have been considered for ARRA grants.
Hyper-Partisan Rejection of HSR Support
California HSR required a large organization accruing state-of-the-art expertise, regulatory reform, 100+ miles of tunnels & viaducts and 496 miles ripe for NIMBY lawsuits. It was always going to cost over the high-end $40 billion figure listed on the HSR Bond Measure.
The $9.95 billion HSR bond was comprised of $9 billion for HSR project and $950 million for San Francisco Bay Area and Los Angeles Metro Area Commuter Rail/Metro Rail projects connecting to California HSR stations. So the minimal hope was for ARRA to provide a matching $9 billion for HSR + $950 million for Commuter Rail/Metro Rail connections to California HSR.
Non-Residential Construction Cost Inflation ensured that ARRA grants lower than $9.95 billion to combine with the $9.95 billion HSR bond could not make a meaningful impact on California HSR’s hoped for Gilroy-Bakersfield Initial Operating Segment that requires expensive tunnels and viaducts.
By 2014, Gilroy-Bakersfield Segment could have be built for about $27 billion and generate operating profit to help fund expansion. That same year, California initiated a Cap & Trade Program with 20% of funding allocated to California HSR project. That could have been enough to complete Initial Operating Segment capable of attracting over 10 million annual riders.
From 2015 to 2025, Cap & Trade provided California HSR an average of $750 million/year or $8 billion. Combining $9.95B HSR Bond + $9.95B Federal + $8B Cap & Trade = $27.9B.
Though Florida HSR’s 84-mile Tampa-Orlando Airport Initial Operating Segment could have been built for about $2.7 billion, DisneyWorld offered $35 million for its own station, and a private company offered nearly $300 million to operate & maintain high-speed trains, more context is needed.
That short 84-mile distance would not convert enough I-4 Freeway drivers to train riders. Big ridership gain would come from 186 mph speeds enabling a 3-hour Trip Time in Tampa-Orlando Airport-Space Coast-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Corridor.
Non-Residential Construction Cost Inflation and utility relocations for 235-mile Orlando Airport-Space Coast-Fort Lauderdale-Miami HSR Segment would likely cost $12 billion — that totals to $15 billion for a 10+ million annual ridership, 319-mile corridor.
Since 2004, four successive Florida Governors (Bush, Christie, Scott, DeSantis) were against HSR or proclaimed they would only support HSR, if Floridians did not have to pay for it.
Using a 60% federal/40 % private HSIPR grant formula in 2010 and making a big assumption that a $7.2B HSIPR grant would follow, no private company(s) indicated commitment to pony up $4.8 billion for a $12 billion Phase 2 total.
Florida should have been disqualified from the Tampa-Orlando Airport ARRA HSR grant, since they would not commit at least 30% state-county match and help lock-in 10% match from a private company in Orlando Airport-Space Coast-Fort Lauderdale-Miami HSR Segment. Also note that Florida spends nearly $10 billion/year on Highways.
Since Republican governors of Wisconsin and Ohio also said they would reject HSR grants, those states should have been disqualified from HSR grants too.

2010-11 ARRA and HSIPR grants awarded, redirected & returned; source USDOT
A year of FRA funding delay after President Obama was sworn-in also hurt. That delay was introduced by the U.S. Inspector General who determined that in early 2009, FRA did not have staffing & expertise to authorize billions of HSR grant dollars.
One should also note that over 2009-10, the House of Representatives requested $4 billion more for High Speed Intercity Passenger Rail (HSIPR). The Senate requested $1.2 billion. Surprisingly, Obama-LaHood only requested $1 billion more HSIPR funding instead of backing the House’s larger $4 billion request.
Extra weight from Obama-LaHood could have landed on $3 billion HSIPR with a Democrat-majority Congress, instead of actual $2.6 billion. California HSR could have received $8 billion ARRA + $1.95 billion HSIPR and left $1.05 billion for other Amtrak projects. Add that $1.05 billion to $790 million in TIGER Rail grants for $1.84 billion to fix freight & commuter rail bottlenecks in states other than California.
Obama-LaHood’s failure to authorize $9.95 billion to lower construction cost and inspire public confidence in America’s flagship HSR project enabled cascading missteps.
Cost Inflation, Biggest Threat To Infrastructure Projects
Non-Residential Construction Cost Inflation is the bane of any large construction project taking longer than 4+ years. Cost inflation tests the will of politicians and a largely uninformed public that doesn’t understand why a tunnel planned to complete in 7 years takes 11 years and nearly costs twice the initial estimate.
On the graph below, Year 1 is based on 2004, Year 3 is based on 2006 and Year 5 is based on 2008 Compounded Non-Residential Construction Cost Inflation.

Non-Residential Construction Cost Inflation in America, 2004-2008; Public Domain
Based on the same November 2008 Draft Business Plan, Governor Schwarzenegger, California Senators Boxer & Feinstein, and 21 California Representatives sent a November 2009 letter to the FRA stating that California HSR deserved a $4.8B grant because its planning was further along than other states and could break ground in late 2011.
Still operating as a 10-person skeleton crew in mid-December 2009, the Authority published the second draft HSR Business Plan with a $43 billion Revised Base Case Estimate. Based on 2008 Non-Residential Construction Cost Inflation, that Revised Base Cost Estimate should have been $48.5 billion.
Another mistake by skeleton California HSR Authority was muddled wording on the HSR Bond Measure suggesting that federal and private funding would cover most of the balance without realistic context. If the Authority was properly staffed, it should have included wording similar to:
“This bond funds Early Works (More staffing for Geo-Technical Studies, Preliminary Engineering, Environmental Reviews, Permitting, and Rights-of-Way). Base Cost Estimate around project start is co-dependent on federal grants for a 60% federal/40% state funding formula similar to New Start Rapid Transit projects. Around the world, private High-Speed Train Operators (HSTO) and Transportation-Oriented Developers (TOD) contribute funds when they can make a 4- to 5-year forecast for the Initial Operating Segment to start generating revenue. San Jose-Bakersfield is the preferred Initial Operating Segment because it can generate significant HSTO and TOD private funding and only requires tunneling through one mountain range to connect San Francisco Bay Area to Central Valley metro cities.”
A properly staffed Authority could have added words to this effect on election materials for the November 2008 HSR Bond Measure:
“The bond helps fund HSR connectivity to 3 Amtrak California lines, 4 Commuter Rail lines, 4 Metro Rail systems and Bus Rapid Transit lines in San Francisco Bay Area, Los Angeles Metro Area and the Central Valley. In a manner similar to California’s 797-mile I-5 Freeway that opened segment-by-segment with connections to boulevards and avenues for early benefits, 800-mile California HSR System will open or upgrade segment-by-segment with early benefits to Amtrak California lines, Commuter Rail and Metro Rail systems.”
Skeleton Authority Soldiers On
A better scenario was still possible. The November 2009 letter from California politicians should have requested $6 billion in ARRA grants, plus $3.95 billion from a later USDOT program, such as High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail (HSIPR) in 2010, to meet the $9.95 billion HSR bond’s 50% match legal requirement.
When the FRA received U.S. Inspector General certification in January 2010, it enabled Transportation Secretary LaHood to authorize HSR grants. Despite the $9.95 billion HSR bond and the state’s supportive letter, the Skeleton Authority only received a $2.25 billion initial FRA grant by January-end.
What a shame. As the chart below indicates, $9.95 billion in federal grants in 2010 could have avoided $7.5-$8.4 billion of cost escalation.

Early USDOT Funding to California HSR, Actual vs. Hypothetical; source Soul Of America
Short-funding wasn’t the only major problem. The Skeleton Authority could not influence FRA to allow more regulatory flexibility on how to best spend HSR grants on such a new mega-project.
Instead of FRA’s spending deadlines on route electrification, signaling & track installation that come later, the Authority needed regulatory flexibility to have early progress measured by staff-up rate, completed geological studies, refined financial analysis, completed public meetings for shorter Environmental Reviews, NIMBY lawsuits navigated, Rights-of-Way (ROW) property acquired, utility relocations and pre-ordered concrete to avoid inflation.
It got worse. By October 2010, state legislators included a budget provision to fund more employees for a better California HSR Business Plan. Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed it — another blow to the project.
Structurally, even if the Authority grew to 40 employees by January 2010, it needed a lot more staff to translate French and Japanese HSR best practices into American HSR construction cost & timeline reality for a Gilroy-Bakersfield Initial Operating Segment attractive to private passenger train operators.
Results were harsh and predictable. The Authority could not forecast how much additional federal & state funding the project would receive and when. Nor could it anticipate federal & state regulatory delays. Two multi-year NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) lawsuits were triggered by overly strict use of HSR Bond funds.
Despite the lower than anticipated federal grant to meet milestone dates, the FRA included Mandatory Project Completion Deadlines with clawback provisions.
By May 2011, the state’s Legislative Analyst’s Office recommended $1.37 million from the HSR Bond to expand staff. It said the project needed 60 to 80 people to manage hundreds of consultants. The Legislative Analyst’s Office should have made that recommendation two years earlier.
Yet in November 2011, the Skeleton Authority had to publish a third California HSR Business Plan based on “gold-plated” work by Parsons Brinckerhoff that raised Base Case Estimate to $98 billion in Year of Expenditure Dollars — inclusive of inflation forecast.
California HSR opponents seized on the 2008-2011 Trail of Setbacks with punishing articles sent to news media to pound on a “Cost Over-run & Mismanagement Narrative“, rather than ask why the federal government did not commit 50-60% from the start.
An under-informed public does not understand that large infrastructure projects always encounter unknowns that create minor to large setbacks.

California HSR: A Train of Setbacks over 2008-2011; (c) Soul Of America
By April 2012, the Authority only reached 30 employees, but in a quickly revised California HSR Business Plan in April 2012 , it cut Base Cost Estimate to $68 billion by blending track-usage with existing commuter rail in the San Francisco Bay Area and Los Angeles Metro Area instead of building two fully dedicated high-speed tracks that require more ROW property and trigger more NIMBY lawsuits.
Gilroy-Fresno-Kings/Tulare-Bakersfield Operating Segment could have opened in 2023-24.
California HSR project needed sustained, flexible, multi-year federal funding aimed at an Initial Operating Segment that reached the San Francisco Bay Area. That would have let hard-section environmental clearances run in parallel and produced an operating line with ridership many years earlier.
The Mystery of Obama’s Failed HSR Gamble
Considering it was a flagship project for the nation like the Apollo Program and the $9.95 billion California HSR Bond passage, Democrat-majority Congress and President Obama should have agreed to $15 billion cut-out from ARRA to enable a 60% federal/40% state-county funding formula for California HSR + Regional Rail-connectivity (Caltrain & Metrolink) projects. Due to Obama Administration ARRA negotiation failure, however, $15 billion USDOT grant was not in the cards.
On February 17, 2009, Obama signed the $787 billion American Recovery & Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to counter the Great Recession. Since a Democrat-majority Congress backed him, Obama still had political capital to funnel a larger ARRA HSR grant and subsequent HSIPR grants to California HSR project when Non-Residential Construction Cost Inflation was very low.
A combined $10 billion in ARRA + HSIPR grants in 2010 was possible for 50% federal/50% state-county funding to meet the federal match requirement listed in the California HSR Bond Measure. Nothing close to that happened because President Obama and Congressional Democrats continued focusing political capital on the ACA Program.
Secretary LaHood did not disqualify Florida, Wisconsin and Ohio because those states would not contribute match funding for HSR project success. In January 2010, Secretary LaHood to granted only $2.25 billion for California HSR project and sliced up the remainder from $8 billion ARRA HSR funds to Florida.
Since the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) received 278 pre-applications seeking $102 billion in total grants from the ARRA HSR program and Democrat Chairman of the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee wanted it, it’s puzzling why 2010 Obama-LaHood did not propose at least $50-54 billion/6 years for HSR and Regional Rail to the 2010 Democrat-majority House and Senate.
Even if $50+ billion was too big to swallow, Obama-LaHood had plenty of signs to carve out $12.75 billion more to California HSR to prevent his HSR program from becoming a failure:
• In late 2009, California’s Governor, the Speaker of the House, two U.S. Senators (including Boxer), and the largest U.S. Representatives delegation lobbied for larger federal HSR grants.
• In December 2009, California HSR Authority’s new business plan indicated a $43 billion Cost Estimate, so $15 billion federal coupled with a $9.95 billion HSR Bond was necessary for a difference-making Initial Operating Segment.
• Over 2009-10, the Republican-minority Congress repeated their pledge to make him a 1-term President by NOT supporting his agenda.
• Opposing parties typically reclaim the Congressional House-majority during mid-term elections.
• In mid-2010, Congressional Democrats were not polling high enough to be confident of maintaining a Democrat-majority House after the November 2010 Election.
• As the largest Tax Donor State for decades, HSR opponents would find it difficult to frame the $15 billion total as a giveaway to California.
In October 2010, LaHood authorized a $715 million HSIPR grant to California HSR. In December 2010, LaHood reallocated $624 million from Wisconsin and Ohio ARRA grants to California HSR. In May 2011, LaHood only reallocated $300 million in grants from Florida’s $2 billion to California HSR.
Over 2010-11, California HSR’s authorized ARRA and HSIPR grants summed to $3.89 billion to combined with $9.95 HSR Bond for only $13.84 billion on a then published $43 billion multi-year, project. It also produced an embarasing 28% federal/72% state funding formula.
Anti-HSR, GOP-Majority House of Representatives
Beginning 2011, the Republication-majority House stuck to their promise. Despite Obama-LaHood’s 2011-17 proposals for $50-60 billion/6 years in HSIPR grants, the Republican-majority House halted their infrastructure and jobs agenda. Here’s a chart of what that looked like year to year.

Obama HSR/Passenger Rail Expansion Rejected by GOP-majority House; sources USDOT Budget Documents
LaHood’s USDOT policy also placed excessive requirements on how to spend FRA grants. For example, $929 million of a federal grant got held up by Trump (45 & 47) because it has to be spent on track, electric & signaling installations, not on concrete infrastructure preceding them.
Subtracting $929 million from $3.89 billion leaves $2.961 million + $9.95 billion for only $12.91 billion and a disgraceful 23% federal/77% state funding formula.
Obama-LaHood failure to make a HSR proposal to the 2010 Democrat-majority Congress and Obama’s political miscalculation that a 2011-16 Republican-majority House would support more Infrastructure-Jobs added 7 years of delay and many billions of inflation dollars to California HSR project.
Despite California HSR Authority start-up challenges and disgraceful federal funding, second-time California Governor Jerry Brown (January 2011-January 2019) continued political support for California HSR project.

Trump 45’s Missed Opportunity, California HSR Antipathy
As Time magazine reported in March 2016, Presidential Candidate Trump said words akin to, “America should have high-speed trains too.” In subsequent informal discussions, Trump 45 added that he would invest in HSR infrastructure without giving an estimate of federal investment.
Since Governor Jerry Brown had a cordial relationship with Trump, good things for HSR were possible.
Trump 45 could have slightly reduced taxes on the rich and still funded signature infrastructure for his legacy. But as the world discovered in January 2017, Trump 45 was an egomaniac President with a secret agenda for hundreds of billions in tax cuts skewed for the rich.
After pontificating that Trump 45 could have allocated billions to California HSR for a legacy-ego project, I stopped in frustration. Based on truth-o-meter tracking by Politifact over 2017-20, Trump 45 grossly reneged on HSR and most other campaign promises.
One sidebar exception snuck by in 2017 after Trump’s Big Tech campaign donors pressed his Transportation of Secretary, Elaine Chao, to co-fund the Caltrain Modernization in San Francisco-San Jose commuter rail corridor. She finally convinced Trump 45 to grant $650 million to that project.
That modernized 51-mile, Caltrain San Francisco-San Jose route became a ridership success shortly after opening in September 2024. Eventually, California HSR will share Modernized Caltrain route.

Unfortunately in January 2019, Trump 45 started a petty dispute with California’s new Governor Gavin Newsom. He withheld the remaining $929 million from Obama’s California HSR grants and threatened California to repay the $2.5 billion HSR grant already spent.
By not funding California HSR segments, Trump 45 added 4 years of Non-Residential Construction Cost Inflation and construction delay.
Biden HSR Funding Decisions Worse That Obama’s
Though pandemic malaise slowed everything from March 2020 to 2021-end, polling for California HSR project in late 2021 was slightly stronger than when the HSR Bond Measure passed in 2008. Vice-President Harris was from California, the largest Tax Donor State with the most Congresspersons.
California committed up to $11 billion more funding through 2030 from the state’s Cap & Trade Program, name-changed to Cap & Invest.
California HSR project had over 400 miles of Environmental Clearance ready for more ROW property acquisition, final engineering design, utility relocation permitting, and construction.
Despite committing $21 billion over 13 years with only a smidgeon of federal funding, California HSR and related Commuter Rail-Amtrak Regional Rail projects were ready to blossom in January 2022.

An easy first step was for Biden to restore $929 million that Trump delayed. The “Amtrak Joe” test was, would he convince his Congressional-majority Democrats to allocate at least $20 billion to California HSR via a Combination of Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and FRA annual budget grants by January 2022.
If Biden did, he would have accelerated momentum for a San Jose-Bakersfield HSR Operating Segment. Counties and cities would join it help pay for station upgrades, railroad over/underpasses, small street closures, and bypass tracks where needed to further Modernize Caltrain’s San Jose-San Francisco segment.
Though President Biden restored President Obama’s $929 million California HSR grant in June 2021, bigger disappointments from him, Democrat Senator Manchin and Democrat Senator Sinema followed.

Biden failed to influence with Manchin and Sinema, when he had carrots & sticks to demand $100 billion for Federal Railroads and $100 billion for Federal Transit projects — only $34 billion more than the $66 billion for Federal Railroads and and $61 billion more than the $39 billion for Federal Transit that listed in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) passed by 69 Senators and signed by Biden in November 2021.
In the big picture, Biden needed the $1.2 trillion BIL to be $1.3 trillion — a number that at least 60 conservative senators could still celebrate for funding well below Biden’s last ditch $1.75 trillion infrastructure proposal.
Federal bureaucracy delayed Biden’s paltry California HSR grants until December 2023. Though $3.5 billion was also allocated to the Portal rail tunnel into downtown San Francisco, Buttigieg’s USDOT failed to allocate the additional $500 million Portal request before leaving office in January 2025. That left Trump 47 opportunity to withhold it too.
HSR funding failure on Biden’s watch added 3 years to the project and jacked up Non-Residential Construction Cost Inflation.
In summary, naive underfunding by Obama, zero funding support by Congressional Republicans over 2011-2017, zero funding & clawbacks by Trump 45, severe underfunding by Biden, excessive regulation in places, lawsuits, and pandemic delay explain how California HSR Phase 1 slipped from what could have been a $75 billion cost and 2028 completion to $126 billion.
Despite setbacks, nearly 70 superstructures in 119 miles of the Central Valley and 52 more miles are in engineering design and ROW property acquisition. Track laying begins in December 2026 and the High-Speed Trains have been ordered. California HSR superstructures have significantly improved Central Valley freight rail service and safety.
49-miles of Partially Modernized Caltrain service have completed. Dozens of railroad over/underpasses are planned/Environmentally Cleared over the next 17-18 years in the Northern and Southern Bookends.
Equally important, the new Governor Xavier Bacerra, elected in a landslide, continues HSR project support. The higher probability of Democrat President in 2029 is likely to channel more funding to California HSR. If re-elected in November 2030, Governor Bacerra and the new President can burnish their legacies with initial California HSR service in 2033.
At the end of the day, California HSR Phase 1’s anticipated completion date is now the 2040s, mostly due to Trump 47’s incompetent halting and delaying all HSR project funding. For context see Interstate High-Speed Rail Funding.
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