Interstate High Speed Rail
Since 1955, American taxpayers have funded a $1.5 trillion Interstate Highway System and a $500 billion Federal Aviation System. Despite our railroad legacy and status as the richest nation on Earth, America has not built an Interstate High Speed Rail System and under-built Rapid Transit systems in large cities. Since most other advanced nations have or are building tremendous highway, airport, high speed rail, rapid transit and regular bus systems to prevent over-congestion in any single transportation mode, why hasn’t America built an Interstate High Speed Rail System?
Its no accident that America lacks an Interstate High Speed Rail System. Prior to 2009, the federal government invested only $4 billion to partially upgrade a 437-mile Amtrak Northeast Corridor to a tepid version of High Speed Rail (HSR). For the other 22,000 Amtrak corridor miles, an outrageously low $1 billion was invested because HSR opponents mislead news media, Congress and Presidents to believe that:
• Outside the Northeast, America doesn’t have enough population density to justify High Speed Rail
• We don’t need High Speed Rail because Americans prefer short flights
• We don’t need High Speed Rail because widening highways solves traffic congestion
Opponents would have you believe a dozen more anti-HSR arguments that are also outdated, opinion misrepresented as fact, half-truths and lies. Understanding Interstate High Speed Rail enough to pass informed judgment requires more than a TV soundbite or short news article. A brief intellectual journey is required to understand why we need the same scale of investment in Interstate High Speed Rail as Federal Aviation. This multi-part article examines mass transportation that embraces the 21st Century, yet begins with the glory days of trains and streetcars. Join us on this fascinating journey, even if you board as a skeptic.
How Our Rail Legacy Was Undermined
America’s intercity passenger trains began in 1830. In an era before highways and automobiles, privately-owned railroads grew rapidly nationwide, creating routes that eventually appeared on the Amtrak System Map shown above. Streetcars were introduced in 1888 by utility companies. In a nation transitioning from horse-drawn carriages, streetcars swiftly blanketed our cities. Between 1897-1907, Chicago, Boston, New York City and Philadelphia opened subway & elevated transit train lines. All transportation modes met at train stations and Americans loved them for enhancing mobility.
Though cars were invented two decades earlier, only rich people could afford them until the Ford Model T arrived for only $825 in 1908 — that’s equivalent to $21,730 in 2016. Despite the Model T, automobiles would not dominate the American lifestyle if taxpayers, including non-drivers, did not convert dirt paths to avenues, boulevards and highways. The Federal Aid Road Act allocated $75 million for building roads and adapting military vehicles for road maintenance. The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1921 provided additional funding for roadway construction. Together, state and federal laws established the tradition of taxpayer subsidy to America’s automotive industry, manifest as 31,000 highway miles by 1924.
Unlike intercity trains, buses and cars that ran on cheap diesel fuel or gasoline, subway & elevated transit trains and streetcars are electric-powered. In the early 20th century, electricity was produced mostly from coal, with oil and hydroelectric dams contributing smaller percentages. Excluding a few cities where streetcars had access to cheap hydroelectricity, like Buffalo near Niagara Falls, more labor is required to convert coal or oil into electricity than to refine oil into gasoline or diesel fuel. Therefore, cost per unit of energy for electricity was more expensive than cost per unit of energy for gasoline or diesel fuel nationwide.
Utility companies charged all customers slightly higher electric rates to subsidize the higher energy cost of streetcars, subway & elevated transit trains.
In October 1929, the Stock Market Crash triggered the Great Depression. By 1931, up to 40% of Americans were unemployed. Relatively few people could afford cars, so they took subway & elevated transit trains, streetcars and buses. Others walked.
Operating on small profits during the Great Depression, the fortunes of streetcar, subway & elevated transit train companies worsened when the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 made it illegal for a business to provide both transport and electricity to the public. One by one, utility companies divested streetcar lines they could no longer subsidize. Subway & elevated transit trains, being faster, more energy-efficient and transporting more patrons per driver than buses, maintained slight profits a while longer.
From 1936-41, utility companies sold 100 streetcar lines in 45 cities to two national streetcar companies owned by a consortium of automotive, oil and tire companies. The consortium made its streetcars less desirable by lowering service frequency and maintenance. The consortium also became principle backers of the Highway Lobby that convinced public transit agencies to purchase more buses. Automobile clubs simpatico with the Highway Lobby formed across America.
During America’s entry to World War II from December 1941-September 1945, subway & elevated transit trains and streetcars got a reprieve. America needed oil & natural gas companies to expand refinery capacity to fuel more trains, ships and, planes that transported soldiers and materials. Once broadly available to the public, oil, natural gas and metals were rationed.
As vital public utilities to maintain the economy and support the war effort, subway & elevated transit trains, streetcars and buses received subsidies and a healthy ration of electricity and diesel fuel. For example, when military personnel arrived by train at Los Angeles Union Station, streetcars transported them to the port for deployment in the Pacific theater of war. The nation’s largest streetcar system also transported 70% of LA residents to defense factories, other workplaces and school.
When World War II ended, oil, natural gas and metal rationing ended. Excess oil refinery capacity made gasoline and diesel fuel cheap. Unlike Europe, Russia and Japan, none of our factories, bridges and seaports were bombed. By retaining the best transportation infrastructure, cheap gasoline, diesel fuel, natural gas, huge mining reserves and large labor force, America emerged from war as the world’s largest manufacturer. The G.I. Bill coupled with a surging economy enabled veterans to buy their first home. Most desirable new homes were in the suburbs. That combination produced longer drives to inner city factories and shipyards. Thus, veterans returning from the war accelerated automobile, tire and gasoline sales.
Transit agencies in new suburban cities purchased buses because they had the same speed, patron capacity and schedule dependability as streetcars, but used cheaper diesel fuel without electric wire & track installation. To further bus purchases, the Highway Lobby supported suburban politicians who favored converting streetcar rights of way into roadway.
New York City, Chicago, Boston and Philadelphia had multi-cabin transit trains, subway tunnels and elevated tracks that buses could never match for passenger capacity, dependable speed, and patron capacity per driver. City transit agencies saved them. San Francisco, Boston, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Newark and Cleveland transit agencies also saved streetcar routes that included tunnels. The herculean effort of devoted citizens got a few New Orleans streetcars and San Francisco cable cars designated as National Historic Landmarks. They became attractions for tourists who paid a ride premium, sparing them from elimination.
In America, Los Angeles is the ultimate example of corporate collusion that prevented Streetcar conversion to Rapid Transit. After World War II, oil refining and defense-aerospace remained LA’s largest industries. A large percentage of veterans relocated to LA for those blue-collar jobs and great weather. Since there was lots of open space in the 1940s, new suburban housing tracts spread up to a 40-mile radius from Downtown LA. With such large distances between work, schools, shopping centers and beaches, Angelenos purchased a higher percentage of cars than other cities.
The consortium-backed Highway Lobby viewed LA streetcar routes as the big prize because, at over 400 miles, it had the nation’s largest streetcar rights of way and Hollywood influence. LA metro area is also fragmented into many semi-autonomous districts and dozens of separate cities. With Highway Lobby backing, auto-centric politicians rose to power over suburban transit agencies. They also pressured the City of Los Angeles to build more avenues and boulevards to handle a larger volume of cars, trucks and buses, particularly where streetcar service declined.
A merger of the two national streetcar companies in the consortium and rapidly declining streetcar service nationwide prompted congressional hearings in 1946 to review the intent of the consortium controlled by General Motors, Standard Oil, Firestone and Mack Trucks. After those powderpuff hearings, General Motors supplied even more buses to transit agencies.
City of Los Angeles officials bravely resisted the trend with a lawsuit they hoped would rescue its ailing streetcar infrastructure. In 1947, the Federal District Court of Southern California indicted the consortium under Sherman Anti-Trust Law. Long story short, the trial was switched to a Midwest federal court sympathetic to the Highway Lobby. The consortium was convicted, but got off with a wrist-slap in 1949.
Legally unfettered, the Highway Lobby stepped up efforts to rip out streetcar tracks, then dismantle or burn streetcars nationwide. LA had only one short streetcar tunnel into Downtown that required political muscle to close. In 1949, the Highway Lobby celebrated completion of the 4-Level Stack Interchange between Arroyo Seco and Cahuenga Pass (“Hollywood”) freeways, while severing streetcar service to the Downtown LA tunnel.
The LA streetcar-death-spiral played out nationwide, though it would take a dozen years for Highway Lobby-backed transit agencies to nail the coffins.
Federal Regulation Chooses Winers & Losers
The Highway Lobby formed in 1932, expanded membership to freight trucking, intercity bus lines, car renters and road construction companies by 1949. With cars, trucks and buses multiplying like ant colonies on a food trail and a powerful Highway Lobby influencing Congress and the President, a higher national fuel tax was approved to accelerate paving of national highway. Since gasoline cost under 10 cents per gallon, driving at highway speeds was cheap fun — some of the time.
In 1950, few federal highways posted speed limits higher than 60 mph due to unbanked curves, insufficient guard rails, poor signage, too many bumps, stoplights and stop signs. The Highway Lobby knew that better highways were needed to fully convert America to an auto-centric lifestyle. To achieve that goal, automotive companies marketed cars as “personal freedom.” Oil companies expanded service stations along boulevards and highways. In an era of only three TV networks and a few national radio programs, automotive and oil companies became the biggest program sponsors. Their marketing pitch was to demand more and better highways to increase your freedom and choose better gasoline and tires for higher automotive performance.
America already had a few limited access, non-stop highways like Arroyo Seco Parkway intersecting Hollywood Freeway in Los Angeles and Pennsylvania Turnpike. They gave a taste of higher non-stop speeds. Knowing that an intercity network of limited access, non-stop highways would jolt America into an auto-centric lifestyle, the Highway Lobby went full throttle convincing President Truman and Congress to fund it.
Something more happened. By interconnecting cities with limited-access non-stop highways, the Highway Lobby added railroads to its crosshairs.
Using Los Angeles as an example in 1950-51, the Highway Lobby convinced the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that a network of limited access, non-stop highways and interchanges would boost business productivity, jobs and product distribution. Together, they asked Congress and President Truman to fund a system of intercity limited access, non-stop highways. They won over many in Congress, but President Truman was pre-occupied funding the Korean War. He only authorized $50 million in the Federal Aid Highway Act that would take effect in 1952.
America’s intercity passenger trains used to commonly reach 110-120 mph top speed with stops every 25-75 miles, producing 80-90 mph average speeds over long distances. In those times, horrific train-ramming-train accidents occurred due to inadequate signaling and lack of parallel siding track for malfunctioning trains to pull aside.
Such accidents were rare until sprawling suburbs and growing towns built more roads crossing tracks. Too many people took deadly risks crossing them.
The Highway Lobby reminded President Truman, Congress and news media of every accident to escalate public outcry for federal railroad regulation.
The safest way to preserve train speed was to improve train signaling and to build parallel siding tracks, overpasses/underpasses and track fencing in cities. Since railroad profits were thin, they could only afford was parallel siding track in a few places.
Given the sordid pre-1929 history of railroad company anti-trust behavior, Congress and President Truman had no predisposition to fund those upgrades. Instead, Truman’s Interstate Commerce Commission enacted regulation in 1952 that effectively limited trains to 79 mph top speed to shorten stopping distances.
Federal regulation also decreed that passenger trains sharing tracks with freight trains must have heavy locomotives, like freight trains, for train-ramming-train crash safety. An unintended consequence is that heavy locomotives do not accelerate or brake as fast. Given suburban growth built more roadways crossing tracks, intercity passenger trains delayed acceleration leaving and slowed down earlier approaching more cities.
Intercity passenger trains fell to 50-60 mph average speed.
President Eisenhower Launches Interstate Highway System
In January 1953, General Eisenhower was sworn in as President. In July 1953, the Korean War ended, but income tax rates on the wealthy remained high. President Eisenhower and Congress were anxious to use those taxes on infrastructure projects to increase jobs and business productivity. Those conditions and a former 5-star general’s transportation perspective caused Eisenhower to go all in for highways.
During World War II, General Eisenhower admired how the Autobahn network of limited-access, non-stop freeways throughout Germany enabled faster movement of tanks, trucks and troops. When the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Highway Lobby called on him as President Eisenhower about similar highways for America, he knew they could also be used for national defense and emergencies. In that manner, President Eisenhower unified three powerful allies (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Highway Lobby, Department of Defense) in his funding pitch to Congress.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and GM produced films and other data that convinced Congress to plan an interstate network of freeways like Arroyo Seco Parkway and Hollywood Freeway, rather than tollways like Pennsylvania Turnpike. Oil companies assured President Eisenhower that America had enough oil to be self-sufficient deep into the 21st Century. The Highway Lobby said that faster autos driving more miles on freeways would consume more gasoline, thereby producing more fuel tax to fund Interstate Highways. The heavy construction industry said more jobs would be created in every state, creating a virtuous cycle of additional taxes to pay for interstate highways.
As it turns out, higher fuel tax was insufficient to build the Interstate Highway System and no one had an appetite for higher taxes. So the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Highway Lobby helped Eisenhower convince Congress to transfer a percentage of general taxes towards the Highway Trust Fund, rather than lower income taxes. Only then could we fund the planned Interstate Highway System.
With all the stars aligned, President Eisenhower could not have timed a better introduction for his National System of Interstate and Defense Highways Plan in 1955. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Highway Lobby marketed the plan, while the Department of Defense added backroom muscle influencing Congressmen in states with military bases. In 1956, President Eisenhower and Congress sorted out the combination of fuel and general taxes to underwrite the first $25 billion of construction for 44,000 miles of the Eisenhower Interstate Highway & Defense System.”
That $25 billion investment has the same buying power as $220 billion in 2016. Initially, the federal government paid for 85-90% of Interstate Highway construction. States paid the balance.
In contrast, railroad companies paid for 100% of rail route construction and maintenance.
With few exceptions, the federal government allowed states to own each Interstate Highway. Thus, each state posts speed limits they judge safe for a stretch of highway, based on straightness and elevation. The fastest legal speed, 85 mph, was posted in the straight flat areas of western states. States took pride of ownership for highways, not railroads owned by private companies.
Since most Interstate Highway was built as limited-access non-stop freeways, drivers only paid for cheap gasoline, oil and fuel tax. Given that every driver, whether they rode Interstate Highways or not, paid fuel taxes and general taxes to build Interstate Highway, they subsidized freight truckers, intercity bus lines and car renters to enjoy lower operating costs than freight and passenger train companies. In other words, Highways were publicly subsidized, Railroads were not.
Few could argue that Interstate Highways were not good for America. Oil was cheap and plentiful. Interstate Highway construction spurred growth in automobile, tire, plastics, oil, freight trucking, intercity bus lines, car rentals, hotel and tourism industries, leading unemployment to 4% or less during much of the Eisenhower Administration. The hey-day 1950s led General Motors executives to boast, “What’s good for GM is good for the nation.”
Funding International Airports Kills Intercity Passenger Rail
Even in long distance routes where intercity passenger rail reached 79 mph, business travelers wanted to reach destinations much faster. Then in October 1958, Boeing launched the Commercial Jet Age. Boeing 707 jets reached cruising speeds up to 550 mph and were pressurized to fly above 25,000 feet to reduce the major hindrance to airline patronage — turbulence. As soon as airports offered more airline routes, business travelers switched from long distance trains to jets. Business travelers loved flying 200-3000 miles across North America in 1 to 6 hours. The also loved flights to the Caribbean and Hawaii.
Promising more aviation-related jobs, Chambers of Commerce influenced federal, state and local politicians to allocate more land and fund International Airport construction via general taxes and bonds. The Highway Lobby backed them because highways to International Airports and oil-based jet fuel consumption would expand as well.
Taxpayer aid to international airports robbed railroad companies of premium-fare, long distance travelers. Evaporating profits forced most intercity passenger trains to cease operations. Many railroad companies died. Most of those who survived focused on transporting heavy cargo unfeasible for freight trucks, coal in particular.
With the railroad industry collapsing, many intercity passenger rail routes were sold to transit agencies in NYC, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, Baltimore and San Francisco. In those cities, taxpayers could partially subsidize their operation as commuter rail transit radiating from central business districts.
As the economy grew, freight rail and freight trucking increased. More freight revenue enabled railroad companies to add parallel siding track in more places. But railroad companies let larger chunks of track quality slip to 69 or 59 mph top speed status.
In 1963, America felt better about the economy, President Kennedy lowering taxes and avoiding war with Russia and Cuba. Shortly before his November 1963 assassination, Kennedy pushed for more Interstate Highway, International Airport and Rapid Transit funding. President Johnson followed through on Kennedy’s plan by announcing that the Great Society Program would allocate funding for rapid transit.
In July 1964, President Johnson started the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA) with a $375 million federal allocation. He promised larger UMTA funding for least 50% of Rapid Transit projects. Unfortunately, the Vietnam War started in August 1964.
As the Vietnam War escalated, it sucked away a larger than expected share of federal funds. That gradually meant less funding for transportation and other Great Society projects. The powerful Highway and Aviation lobbies helped Interstate Highway and International Airport projects command the lion’s share of a smaller transportation budget. By 1966, that left scraps for Rapid Transit projects.
In the 1960s, larger chunks of the Interstate Highway System opened enabling drivers to average 65-75 mph for 2 to 5 hours. That was 10-15 mph faster than intercity passenger trains. Having lost speed and profitable long distance routes to jets, a few intercity passenger trains survived by selling slow speed scenery and comfort over very long journeys, like the California Zephyr. Unfortunately for railroad companies, the market for slow long distance routes is very small.
America’s transportation mode change was profound. In 1950, there were 9,000 trains carrying 50% of intercity passenger traffic. By 1970, there were only 450 trains carrying 7% of intercity passenger traffic. Low passenger volume could not save the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. Once the largest union of black employees, it became the unfortunate answer to a trivia question. America built the world’s most comprehensive freeway system and best international airports. Most streetcar tracks were removed to widen avenues and boulevards that fed freeways.
By 1970, the LA had a spiderweb of modern freeway interchanges and a thriving world-class airport. At the same time, Los Angeles Union Station was nearly rendered a ghost town. Even streetcar tracks to the station were removed.
Meanwhile, LA’s automotive and aviation transportation model was mass marketed in movies and TV programs. Following LA’s lead, old train stations nationwide were diminished, demolished or converted to non-transportation use.
Amtrak Becomes A Flicker Of Hope For Intercity Passenger Trains
In 1971, President Nixon was consumed by the Vietnam War, but the U.S. Chamber of Commerce helped him understand that population expansion to suburbs was increasing suburb-to-downtown drives. They in turn, were generating traffic congestion that constrained the flow of goods & services. Before the Watergate Hearings in 1973, the first OPEC Oil Embargo increased President Nixon’s influence with Congress to modestly boost UMTA funding. That sped up construction of rapid transit projects in a handful of cities. Nixon and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce also convinced Congress to consolidate remaining intercity passenger train companies as one public-private entity, Amtrak.
Though Nixon wanted faster intercity passenger rail and more rapid transit projects, Congress continued awarding the lion’s share of federal transportation grants to Interstate Highways and International Airports, followed by Mass Transit. Amtrak remained a funding orphan. Without federal grants for railroad overpasses/underpasses, track & signal upgrades, a faster train control system and fencing, Amtrak was like slow moving museums preserving American heritage.
To begin conserving gasoline in 1974, President Ford signed an Executive Order to enact the 55 mph National Highway Speed Limit. In defiance, people commonly drove 65 mph.
In 1976, President Ford convinced Congress to fund a faster train control system, track repairs and better crossing arms in the Boston-NYC-Washington rail corridor. Those modest upgrades enabled Amtrak to reach 69-90 mph top speed in the corridor again.
In 1978, President Carter proposed that we fund overpasses/underpasses, new trains and fencing in the Boston-NYC-Washington rail corridor to enable 125 mph top speed similar to the Japan’s high speed rail system. Congress tabled his proposal. Also that year, the Aviation Lobby convinced Congress and Carter to deregulate air travel — sparking lower airfares, more regional flights and more taxpayer-funded airport expansion.
In December 1979, another OPEC Oil Crisis hit America. Many people wondered if there was enough oil to go around. Overnight, long lines formed to refill gasoline tanks. To conserve oil, President Carter ordered enforcement of the 55 mph National Highway Speed Limit. Due to re-fueling hassles and slower highway speeds, most people refused to drive over 2-3 hours, crippling tourism in the Stagflation Era.
The downtick in economic activity chastened President Carter and Congress to boost UMTA funding for rapid transit projects and conversion of 6 surviving streetcar routes to faster, higher capacity Light Rail. Again, Carter proposed a Boston-NYC-Washington High Speed Rail project. If successful, it would spark an Interstate High Speed Rail System.
Competition for larger federal transportation grants did not sit well with the Highway Lobby and Aviation Lobby. They convinced Congress to ride out the storm with OPEC before voting on President Carter’s proposal. Within months after the December 1979 Oil Crisis, other nations sold us more oil that returned gasoline prices to a comfortable, yet slightly higher level. Gasoline lines disappeared. Though the National Highway Speed Limit remained 55 mph, people commonly exceeded it by 10 mph again. Under those conditions, congressional willpower to build a high speed rail corridor wilted.
In 1980 however, President Carter obtained funding to upgrade Boston-NYC-Washington rail corridor with more overpasses/underpasses, new electric overhead wires and fencing. Carter also deregulated freight rail to restore some of its competitive edge versus freight trucking.
Congressmen outside the Northeast, Chicago and San Francisco Bay Area knew that Amtrak and UMTA funding did not resonate with their constituency. Once President Reagan arrived in 1981, those congressmen, aided by Highway and Aviation lobbies, started a false narrative that Amtrak and UMTA funding represent “Social Welfare for the Poor“, while they hypocritically promoted Highways and Airports to be “Vital Public Utilities” deserving of taxpayer subsidy.
Another false narrative by the Highway Lobby was to portray slow public buses as a viable alternative to Rapid Transit.
When the Carter-funded railroad overpasses/underpasses, electric overhead wires and fencing project completed in 1984, electric-powered Amtrak returned to 110 mph top speed in the NYC-Washington corridor segment and 79 mph top speed in the Boston-NYC corridor segment.
From January 1981-January 1993, Presidents Reagan and Bush I are most responsible for politics that treated Amtrak and Rapid Transit as Social Welfare. Reagan and Bush I convinced a majority of Congress to cripple Amtrak funding and subsidize more slow buses as a substitute for increased Rapid Transit. In contrast, they awarded princely grants to Interstate Highway and International Airport expansion. For example, $4.8 billion was spent on Denver International Airport alone, most of it federally funded.
At the same time as Reagan-Bush Administrations, Japan, France, Belgium, Italy, Germany and Spain leaped ahead with electric-powered 155-186 mph intercity high speed rail lines.
Which High Speed Rail Model Fits America?
When President Clinton took office in January 1993, regional flights became so popular, that they were congesting international airports more than long-distance flights. A drive to airport, collect boarding pass, luggage drop-off, security check-in, boarding, flight, un-boarding, luggage pick-up, taxi to local destinations ballooned the shortest Journey Time for regional flights from 2 hours to 3 hours.
To combat regional flight congestion, Japan and Western Europe built intercity high speed rail lines in popular high-traffic corridors. Having political, economic and terrain conditions most similar to America’s East Coast, the high speed rail system in France merits closer examination.
Major cities of France were spared from World War II bombing, but many railroad bridges were sabotaged by the French Underground. Many bridges needed rebuilding to resume intercity passenger rail service. When the European theater of World War II ended in May 1945, France started those repairs. Though it never had vast oil fields for cheap gasoline & diesel fuel, the democratic-market economy of France produced household income and strong citizen rights similar to ours. France had large automotive and freight trucking industries prodding government to expand the 81 mph-Autoroute tollway system across a country the size of Texas. It had a large defense-aerospace industry urging government to expand international airports.
When their High Speed Rail planning started in 1971, France’s 54 million residents had a strong say in land-takings. Enough protesters could overturn Imminent Domain for any transportation project. Pressure was on to make the first French HSR route a success. Otherwise, future HSR construction was at stake.
Several factors gave the French government confidence to invest the equivalent of $6 billion in their first HSR line, called Train a Grande Vitesse (TGV). Paris and Lyon, France’s two largest cities, are only 274 miles apart without a large mountain range between them. Autoroute often clogged from the Belgian border through Paris and Lyon to Marseilles on the Mediterranean Sea. Paris had a large Metro system and Lyon was scheduled to opened its Metro system in 1978, with more expansion funded. Both Metro Rail systems would directly feed train stations serving TGV. For faster, smoother and more dependable TGV ride experience than standard 100-112 mph train service, the French were building straighter, leveler, continuous-welded high speed-only tracks with overpasses/underpasses for every road, complete fencing, new overhead electrical wires and high-speed signaling. To maintain high average speed, TGV stops would be 90 to 125 miles apart.
When electric-powered 168 mph TGV opened between Paris and Lyon in 1981, French Highway and Aviation lobbies pressured the government to make TGV prove operating success before expansion. That success came quickly, as fatigued Autoroute drivers between Paris and Lyon welcomed the short TGV Journey Time and comfortable ride. The absence of diesel fumes by electric-powered trains also permitted train stations to shield outside weather and include restaurants, cafes and shops for a pleasant all-season travel experience.
By 1988, TGV engines and signaling system were upgraded to support 186 mph. Train frequency increased. Coach fares lowered, enticing more double-occupant drivers to switch from Autoroute to the time & cost savings of TGV.
By 1993, new TGV routes sprouted from Paris to Tours, LeMans, Lille, Calais and Brussels and from Lyon south to Valence. Paris and Lyon TGV-Metro stations hosted as many restaurants, cafes, shops, shuttles, taxis and nearby hotels as an international airport. The Channel Tunnel enabling Paris-London and London-Brussels Eurostar HSR service was set to open in 1994. TGV construction from Valence to Marseilles was also underway.
Wherever a TGV/Eurostar station integrated Metrorail or Tramway (Light Rail) station, passengers made more day trips in those cities and sub-regions. The French, British and Belgians quickly discovered that TGV/Eurostar + Metro stations rejuvenated cities along each HSR route with increased tax revenue from domestic and international tourists. Freight truckers appreciated less congestion on Autoroute as well.
Bill Clinton Funded Our First Interstate High Speed Rail Route
By 1993, Interstate Highway speed limits returned to 60-80 mph, which meant people drove 65-90 mph top speed. Factoring in stops and toll stations in the Boston-NYC-Washington corridor, drivers averaged about 60 mph — less during holiday traffic congestion. Given Americans adopted proclivity for cars, Amtrak would have to average significantly faster that 60 mph to attract more riders in the Northeast Corridor.
The Clinton Administration referenced the French TGV system as the model for Interstate High Speed Rail. Emerging from recession, he allocated economic stimulus funds to upgrade the Northeast Corridor with a goal for 150 mph HSR service. He allocated slightly more grants towards Boston, NYC, Newark, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington rapid transit projects as well.
Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration followed those wise decisions with critical HSR construction mistakes. When Amtrak Acela service started in 2001, those mistakes limited NYC to Washington to 135 mph top speed for a small percentage of miles. Factoring in Slow Zones, Acela reached only 84 mph average speed in that rail corridor. Plagued by even more Slow Zones between NYC and Boston, Acela averaged only 63 mph, despite achieving 150 mph top speed for 18 miles.
Since the Highway Lobby and Aviation Lobby did not want successful Acela service spawning competition, they exploited Clinton Administration mistakes by funding Cato, Reason and Heritage think tanks to disseminate analyst reports, interviews and news articles that amplified a false “Amtrak is Social Welfare” narrative into political football. Their disinformation succeeded to the point where most Americans never question larger public subsidy (“Social Welfare”) of Highways and Airports. Moreover, most Americans who travel abroad never ask, “If High Speed Rail is succeeding elsewhere, why not here?
Averaging only 50-60 mph with few daily trains outside the Northeast Corridor, few Americans rode trains. Absent higher patronage, Amtrak was forced to beg for federal and state subsidies every year. In return for paltry tax subsidies, many congressmen and governors forced Amtrak to maintain once or twice daily Slow Zone routes through their rural congressional districts and states. Calling those slow routes “Social Welfare” in 2004, President Bush II tried to kill Amtrak.
New Opportunity To Build An Interstate High Speed Rail System
American rail routes are mostly owned by freight train companies and to a lesser degree, by pubic transit agencies. By law, freight train companies and transit agencies lease Amtrak trains access to their tracks. Since leasing fees are low, freight train companies have no incentive to upgrade infrastructure for high speed. Nor do transit agencies have extra funds lying around. Consequently, most of America’s intercity passenger rail is plagued with “Slow Zones” that limit Amtrak, outside the Northeast Corridor, to:
• 50-60 mph average speed
• trains traveling in opposite directions on the same track
• 1 or 2 daily trains
• regulation requiring Amtrak to have heavy locomotives that slow acceleration & braking
• old signaling systems
• excessively curvy & old tracks
• antiquated bridges & tunnels
• autos, people and animals crossing tracks
• slow freight trains limiting faster Amtrak trains sharing their tracks
As bad as Slow Zones are for Amtrak, they are fine for freight trains and tolerable for commuter rail trains.
Fortunately, a positive HSR narrative is emerging. Though Acela HSR is mediocre by world standards, by 2006 that route started operating at a profit. Congressmen and governors funded small Amtrak projects proposed by Departments of Transportation (DOT) in California, Washington and the Northeastern states that reduced Slow Zones to restore speed, increase daily trains and improve punctuality. As a result, their patronage posted significant gains and reduced operating subsidies from states.
Electric-powered Amtrak Keystone service in Philadelphia-Harrisburg route was upgraded from 79 mph top speed & 6 daily trains to 110 mph top speed & 13 daily trains. The speed and frequency boost attracted so many new patrons that operating budget is approaching break-even. From that evidence, dozens more state DOTs concluded that reducing Slow Zones for faster, frequent, higher capacity trains is more efficient and cheaper than widening highways.
On the heels of Amtrak patronage growth, the Institute for Civil Engineers and the well-respected Brookings Institution agreed that America needs an Interstate High Speed Rail System. Many state DOTs hoped a change in sentiment by the next Congress and President would allocate more federal funds for higher train speeds and more trains per day.
California voters approved a $10 billion bond measure to help build a world-class HSR system. State DOTs convinced 37 governors and even more mayors of both parties to support HSR projects. President-elect Obama could measure their support by applications for $75 billion of federal funds for intercity passenger rail projects.
President Obama Kickstarts Interstate High Speed Rail
In 2009-10, America finally progressed towards Interstate High Speed Rail. President Obama directed $8 billion in economic stimulus funds to more passenger rail corridors selected for speed, frequency and safety upgrades. To address Amtrak’s maintenance backlog, he directed another $5 billion over 5 years. A few months afterwards, Congress allocated $2 billion more and another $3 billion came from various states towards Amtrak/HSR projects.
America’s first black president, whose mantra was “Change We Can Believe In“, began building Interstate High Speed Rail amidst two wars and the Great Recession. His actions suggest a poetic bookend to President Lincoln who authorized construction of the Transcontinental Railroad amidst the Civil War.
The $18 billion investment by Obama and several governors is paying off. Slow Zones were reduced and new Amtrak trains were added in the Northeast Corridor, California, Virginia, North Carolina, Washington, Oregon, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin, Missouri, New Hampshire and Maine. Amtrak’s federal operating subsidy has declined to only 15% of operating budget due to growing patronage on these upgraded routes. More of Amtrak’s federal funding can be allocated to train speed and frequency upgrades.
What’s not to like?
Since an inflation-adjusted $220 billion kickstarted the Interstate High System, President Obama was fully aware that $18 billion was not a sufficient kickstart to an Interstate High Speed Rail System. He envisioned larger funding to more HSR projects with a federal plan to glue them together to serve 80% of Americans by 2035. If successful, President Obama would create a transportation legacy similar to President Eisenhower, who kick-started the Interstate Highway System.
American taxpayers have proven they are willing to invest in transportation modes that go where and when we want to go. The inflation-adjusted $220 billion Interstate Highway System planned in 1955, cost $1.5 trillion to complete. Since 2011, that system has been ready for maintenance mode to repair highway surfaces, interchanges and bridges. We also spent about $500 billion on federal aviation infrastructure.
Since America needed more jobs emerging from the Great Recession and the multi-year Surface Transportation Bill was coming up for renewal in summer 2010, President Obama believed that timing was right to build an Interstate High Speed Rail System, expand Rapid Transit, and repair Interstate Highways across all 50 states. What happened?
Observe the High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail Program Map below, then ask yourself:
• Why is no Minneapolis-Milwaukee-Chicago-Indianapolis-Cincinnati HSR route underway?
• Why does Southeast HSR construction stop in Charlotte, rather than 3-times larger Atlanta?
• Why doesn’t Texas-Oklahoma have a HSR route under construction?
• Why did Florida turn down federal & private grants to build a 185 mph HSR system for a mostly 79 mph rail line backed by federal loans?
Though Chambers of Commerce warmed to High Speed Rail and the Aviation Lobby has stopped its vocal opposition, the Highway Lobby is deathly scared of it. Congress buckled to the Highway Lobby, underfunding Amtrak/HSR projects again, since 2011.
SUMMARY: Federal & State Governments Picked Winners & Losers
An insidious timeline of passenger rail destruction was complete. Federal & state funding anchored the building of International Airports and Interstate Highways. Federal regulation crippled streetcar business models without federal funding to convert more streetcars routes to rapid transit. Federal courts failed to stop corporate collusion that killed off streetcars. Federal regulation slowed trains below highway speeds. Excluding 2009-10, neither High Speed Rail or Rapid Transit projects received adequate federal & state funding because half of Congress and three Presidents believed falsehoods.
Other leading nations took a different approach to transportation infrastructure well suited for 21st Century conditions. Their approach is described in Part 2.